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During times of emergency situations extraordinary powers may be vested in 
the executive in order to prevent or reduce its impact. Emergency legislation is 
usually explicit about its extraordinary nature and requires triggers that enable the 
executive to use extraordinary powers. However, in recent times, New Zealand’s 
parliament has passed legislation that contains extraordinary powers, yet does 
neither draw attention to its extraordinary status, nor requires any triggers. As 
these acts did not directly deal with a threat to life or property, but instead likely 
had an economic purpose, it appears that Parliament created extraordinary 
powers out of convenience, rather than necessity. Due to New Zealand’s political 
constitution, acts of parliament cannot be challenged in court. This approach 
bears the danger of executive creep, where the executive gets more and more power 
in order to “get things done”, with little regard to constitutional safeguards.
I. Introduction
In 2010, the New Zealand Parliament passed the Environment 
Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water Management) 
Act 2010 (ECan Act) in response to an alleged inability of the regional 
council, Environment Canterbury, to effectively manage Canterbury’s water 
resources.1 Between 2006–2008, Environment Canterbury had failed to meet 
the vast majority of statutory time limits when processing resource consent 
applications.2 Canterbury is the home of a large part of both irrigated land 
and water consumption in New Zealand, and the government decided to pass 
urgent legislation to rectify the situation. The ECan Act was passed under 
urgency in March 2010, and it contained several constitutionally significant 
provisions. Inter alia, it provided for the replacement of elected councillors by 
appointed commissioners, established extensive regulation making powers, 
and restricting access to the Environment Court.
1 Environment Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water Management) 
Act 2010 [ECan Act] (30 March 2010) 661 NZPD 9927; (30 March 2010) 661 NZPD 9930.
2 Ministry for the Environment Resource Management Act: Two-yearly Survey of Local Authorities 
2007/2008 (June 2009) Appendix 4; see also (30 March 2010) 661 NZPD 9927. 
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One year later, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 (CER 
Act) was passed in response to the ongoing earthquakes in the Canterbury 
region. In particular, the February earthquake had had devastating effects 
on the city, causing many casualties and making large parts of Christchurch 
uninhabitable. After 10 weeks of a state of emergency, the CER Act was meant 
to facilitate and expedite the recovery efforts and the rebuild of the region. 
To that end, it contained extensive executive powers reminiscent of those 
available during a state of emergency, such as the power to enter or restrict 
access to premises and roads, control the dissemination of information, 
and the requisition of property. In addition, the Act contained substantial 
regulation making powers.
Extraordinary public powers, such as the ones contained within these 
two Acts, are usually reserved for emergency situations in which ordinary 
public powers are not sufficient to effectively deal with a crisis. Ordinary 
constitutional processes are too slow to respond to the immediate needs of 
the population, so that they must be restricted to enable swift help and relief 
to those affected. We are therefore accustomed to extraordinary powers in the 
form of emergency powers provided for by emergency legislation.
Neither of the situations that led to the passing of the ECan Act and the 
CER Act can be described as emergencies in the traditional sense. While both 
addressed issues that required solutions, neither case required immediate 
action. Both situations could have arguably been resolved through normal, or 
at least less severe means. It may therefore be that the powers created by these 
Acts are inappropriately broad.
In general constitutional theory, the propriety of emergency powers is 
determined by establishing the constitutional norm, whether the power in 
question derogates from that norm, and whether this derogation is justified.3 
However, the constitutional system in New Zealand does not provide for 
legal means to evaluate the propriety of statutory powers. While the exercise 
of public powers by the executive can be judicially reviewed, the content of 
these powers cannot. The reason, of course, is that Parliament is sovereign 
and its legislation beyond legal reproach. The only way to hold it accountable 
for its actions is through political means, that is, general elections. This 
approach to constitutionalism is called political constitutionalism, and it 
relies on a constitutionally conscientious legislator and a constitutionally 
aware constituency.4
This paper argues that the constitutional safeguards provided in this way 
have not been working as sufficiently as they could. It appears that Parliament 
has, on occasion, provided for excessively extraordinary statutory powers 
(such as in the case of the ECan Act and the CER Act) out of convenience 
rather than necessity. The paper will first explore the concept of extraordinary 
3 John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino “The law of the exception: A typology of emergency 
powers” 2004 2(2) ICON 210 at 222, 223.
4 Mark Tushnet Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 
2014) at 47.
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powers in New Zealand. It will show that, due to the lack of supreme law, 
no statutory power is technically extraordinary. Any derogation from 
constitutional norms is justified by the fact that Parliament is supreme. In order 
to determine what is extraordinary, we have to therefore rely on an explicit 
statement by Parliament that a given power is extraordinary (for example, 
powers provided for by the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, 
which are available only when a state of emergency is declared). However, 
taking the literal meaning of “extraordinary”, we can find other statutory 
powers that are extraordinary, not because they have been labelled as such, 
but because they are unusually broad compared to other statutory powers. The 
paper will then explore ways to evaluate the propriety of extraordinary powers 
and how these ways interact with our system of political constitutionalism. It 
will argue that while such extraordinary powers, particularly those provided 
for by the ECan Act and the CER Act, are constitutionally “legal”, they may 
not be “legitimate”. It will conclude that it may be time to revisit our concept 
of parliamentary sovereignty and introduce limited review powers as a “soft” 
check on parliamentary legislation.
II. Extraordinary Powers in New Zealand
When speaking of extraordinary powers, we usually think of powers 
available to the executive during times of emergency. The constitutional 
concept of emergency powers dates back at least to the time of the Roman 
Republic.5 When Rome was threatened by a crisis (generally a threat of 
invasion of its territory), the elected Senate would derogate all governmental 
powers to an appointed Dictator. The mandate of this Dictator was to do 
anything necessary to avert the threat and resolve the crisis, after which 
power was transferred back to the Senate and ordinary government resumed.
The modern state relies on a set of constitutional rules in order to facilitate and 
guarantee transparent and limited government.6 Constitutional processes and 
procedures slow down decision-making, but a crisis situation does not allow for 
careful and slow contemplation. The executive may need to be freed from time-
consuming bureaucracy and constitutional safeguards. This capacity to suspend 
constitutional norms and empower the executive may find its justification in 
the concept of necessity, or it may be inherent to the nature of sovereignty.7 
Regardless, the welfare of the population outweighs the need of strict adherence 
to constitutionalism: “the constitution is not a suicide pact.”8 
5 Victor V Ramraj “Emergency powers and constitutional theory” 2011 41(2) HKLJ 165 at 
170.
6 Tushnet, above n 4, at 49.
7 Carl Schmitt said that “[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception.”, Carl Schmitt Political 
Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (George Schwab MIT Press 1985) (1922) 
at 5; see also generally Giorgio Agamben State of Exception (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2005) at 1–31.
8 Terminiello v City of Chicago 337 US 1 (Jackson J, dissenting).
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Unlike during the time of the Roman Republic, emergency powers 
today do not generally suspend the constitutional order wholesale.9 Instead, 
emergency law tends to respond to the particular needs of the pertinent 
emergency situation. Which constitutional norms are modified, to what 
extent, and which extraordinary powers are awarded, depends on the specific 
situation. Emergency law is tailored towards the requirements of the executive 
to be able to deal with the crisis situation. For example, extraordinary powers 
created by the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 enable the 
government to deal with natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes. 
Civil defence emergency management groups have powers to evacuate, clear 
buildings and roads, create emergency shelters, and direct resources.10 The 
Health Act 1956 allows for isolation and quarantine of people in the case of 
an epidemic.11 
A. Formal versus Functional Emergency Powers 
New Zealand uses the legislative model of emergency law, whereby 
extraordinary powers for emergency situations are created through ordinary 
legislation. This stands in contrast to the Neo-Roman model, where 
extraordinary powers are provided on a constitutional level, that is, they are 
inherent to the constitutional system.12 As constitutional provisions tend 
to be general in nature, constitutional emergency powers tend to be very 
broad and sweeping. The executive is given a carte blanche to deal with the 
crisis. The Neo-Roman model was popular in Europe during the early 20th 
century. However, it has given way to the legislative model in most modern 
democracies for two reasons: (1) the Neo-Roman model is associated with 
authoritarian regimes, where emergency powers are used to gain influence 
and suppress the opposition;13 (2) under the legislative model, emergency law 
gains additional democratic legitimacy, as it is created by a popular assembly 
of representatives.14
Because emergency powers are created for specific situations under the 
legislative model, they tend to be spread widely across the statute book. In 
its review of the legislative response to national emergencies, the Regulations 
Review Committee has identified 59 pieces of legislation that contain “statutory 
9 With the possible exception of Martial Law. However, it is disputed whether Martial Law 
is still applicable in the NZ context, see NZ Law Commission Final Report on Emergencies 
(1991) at [4.46].
10 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, Part 5.
11 Health Act 1956, Part 4.
12 Remnants of such broad inherent powers can be seen in New Zealand in the concepts of the 
royal prerogative, state necessity, and possibly Martial Law; see NZ Law Commission, above 
n 9, at [4.33]–[4.48].
13 See, for example, Hitler’s “legal” rise to power thanks to emergency powers provided for by 
Art 48 of the Weimar Constitution.
14 Ferejohn and Pasquino, above n 3, at 215.
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powers of those exercising public power in an emergency.”15 These range from 
general emergency powers in dedicated emergency statutes, such as the Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, to more specific powers in cases 
of epidemics, threats to food safety, hazard substance emergencies, fires, 
terrorism and war. Although some jurisdictions create one all-encompassing 
piece of emergency legislation,16 the New Zealand Law Commission strongly 
advised against this in its Final Report on Emergencies.17 It said that such 
legislation tended to create broad and ill-defined extraordinary powers akin 
to those under the Neo-Roman model. 
All of the statutory powers identified by the Regulations Review Committee 
are formally designated as powers to be used in case of a pre-defined emergency 
situation. However, looking only at formal emergency powers does not reveal 
the full picture of extraordinary powers in New Zealand. It does not uncover 
such public powers that are formally ordinary, but functionally extraordinary. 
New Zealand’s strong adherence to the concept of parliamentary sovereignty 
means that, strictly speaking, all statutory powers are ordinary. As there is no 
higher law than parliamentary legislation, there is no difference between a 
statutory power created for everyday use by the bureaucracy and one created 
for exceptional use in times of crisis. Both powers are created through the 
same legislative process and subject only to review by Parliament itself. To this 
end, Dicey himself proclaimed that emergency law cannot exist in England.18
Of course, while there may be no formal difference between ordinary 
and emergency law in New Zealand, there certainly is a functional one. 
Emergency law is meant to be exceptional; emergency powers are excessive, 
as they must enable swift and effective emergency response. For that reason, 
such powers are meant to be only temporary, as once the crisis is averted there 
is no need for such powers. 
In political systems where constitutional norms are supreme law, the 
difference can be measured by the extent to which the powers infringe on 
constitutional norms, and this determination is adjudicated by a court or 
some other form of constitutional entity. Parliament in New Zealand, on the 
other hand, is not subject to external review, and neither is parliamentary 
legislation. The only adjudicator who determines whether a statutory power 
is extraordinary or not is Parliament itself. Emergency statutes generally 
designate certain powers as extraordinary, in that they are only available when 
15 Regulations Review Committee Interim report on the Inquiry into Parliament’s legislative 
response to future national emergencies (May 2015) at 6.
16 Emergencies Act RSC 1988 c 22.
17 NZ Law Commission, above n 9, at [4.11].
18 Albert Venn Dicey Introduction to the Law of the Constitution (5th ed, MacMillan and Co, 
London, 1897); in response to the Privy Council decision in Ex Parte DF Marais (1902) AC 
109, Dicey later conceded that martial law could be established by an act of Parliament, 
Albert Venn Dicey Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution (7th ed, Macmillan 
and Co, London, 1908) at 538–555; see also David Dyzenhaus “The ‘Organic Law’ of Ex 
Parte Milligan” in Austin Sarat (ed) Sovereignty, Emergency, Legality (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2010) 16–57 at 42–53.
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certain conditions are met; for example, during a state of emergency under 
the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002,19 when an epidemic 
notice is issued by the Prime Minister under the Epidemic Preparedness 
Act 2006,20 a biosecurity emergency is declared under the Biosecurity Act 
1993,21 or when the Prime Minister believes on reasonable grounds that an 
international terrorist emergency exists.22 In each of these cases it is clear that 
the statutory powers in question only become available upon a clearly defined 
and urgent situation.
But what if Parliament, by oversight or design, creates a functionally 
extraordinary power without a clear signpost and which is not subject to 
strict conditions? In lieu of legal mechanisms to determine the extraordinary 
nature of such public powers, it may be difficult to detect and distinguish 
extraordinary powers from ordinary ones. 
From a conceptual point of view extraordinary powers follow a certain 
structure. In order to determine that a provision is extraordinary, we require 
(1) a norm and (2) a derogation.23 That means that if the pertinent power 
is a derogation of ordinary public powers, it must be extraordinary. There 
are thus two ways of detecting them within the New Zealand context: by 
comparing “ordinary” statutory provisions with those usually only available 
during exceptional times; and/or by looking for statutory powers that are so 
extreme that they are commonly regarded as exceptional. 
Both the CER Act 2011 and the ECan Act 2010 illustrate statutory powers that 
are not formally designated as emergency powers but which contain powers 
usually deemed extraordinary.
B. Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011
The CER Act 2011 was passed in order to aid and expedite the recovery of 
the Canterbury region following the earthquakes of 2010-12.24 It established 
a dedicated authority responsible for facilitating the recovery process – the 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA); CERA was tasked to 
develop a recovery strategy and recovery plans;25 and the Act created a range of 
statutory powers to enable CERA and the Minister for Earthquake Recovery 
to effect the recovery efficiently. Among other powers, the Act provided for 
the ability to control gathering and dissemination of information,26 enter 
19 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, Part 5.
20 Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006, ss 4, 5.
21 Biosecurity Act 1993, s 144.
22 International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987, s 6.
23 See Ferejohn and Pasquino, above n 3, at 222.
24 Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act, s 3. The Act was repealed and replaced on 19 April 
2016 by the Greater Christchurch Regeneration Act 2016.
25 At ss 11–26.
26 At ss 29–32.
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premises and restrict access to buildings and roads,27 demolish and erect 
buildings,28 and requisition property.29 
While these powers certainly enable and aid the recovery of an earthquake-
struck region, they are strongly reminiscent of such powers which had been 
identified by the Law Commission as typical emergency powers.30 Even more 
pertinently, they broadly mirror powers available under the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act 2002 during a state of emergency.31 That means 
that the CER Act provided for the continuation of several public powers that 
are usually reserved for a situation which requires a formal declaration and the 
availability of which is limited to a seven-day period.32 It is difficult to argue, 
then, that the powers created by the CER Act are merely ordinary statutory 
powers. If such powers are extraordinary during a state of emergency, they are 
certainly extraordinary in the absence of such a state.
The Act even included provisions that did not apply during a state of 
emergency. It empowered CERA to compulsorily acquire real property. This 
power went beyond the ordinary compulsory acquisition powers under the 
Public Works Act 1981, under which a decision acquire property can be 
challenged in the Environment Court.33 In contrast, the CER Act excluded 
the ability to appeal most decisions made under the Act, including the 
decision to acquire property compulsorily.34 Both the compulsory acquisition 
powers of CERA and the extent to which appeals are limited is clearly out of 
the ordinary.
Perhaps the most unusual power under the Act was the ability of the 
Governor-General to create provision by Order in Council and on the 
recommendation of the Minister for Earthquake Recovery necessary for 
the purposes of facilitating and expediting recovery.35 Such a general power 
to create regulations is usually referred to as a “Henry VIII” clause, as it 
essentially allows government by decree. Effectively, the executive can create 
law without the normal parliamentary oversight, and such law can override 
other primary legislation.36 The Law Commission regarded such sweeping 
regulation-making powers as justified only where either the exact measures to 
deal with an emergency or the nature of the emergency cannot be predicted.37 
27 At ss 33–34, 45–47.
28 At ss 38–43.
29 At ss 52–59.
30 NZ Law Commission, above n 9, at [3.106].
31 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, Part 5.
32 At s 70.
33 Public Works Act 1981, ss 23–27.
34 Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act, s 68; only the amount of compensation for compulsory 
acquisition may be challenged, s 69(1)(a).
35 At s 71.
36 Tim Macindoe and Lianne Dalziel “New Zealand’s response to the Canterbury earthquakes” 
(paper presented to Australia-New Zealand Scrutiny of Legislation Conference, Brisbane, 
July 2011). 
37 NZ Law Commission, above n 9, at [5.69]–[5.71].
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This strongly suggests that Henry VIII clauses are extraordinary and should 
be used only in extraordinary cases.38
C. Environment Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and Improved 
Water Management) Act 2010
The ECan Act also has exceptional constitutional effects and provides for 
a range of unusual powers. The main effect of the Act is the replacement 
of democratically elected regional councillors by Government-appointed 
commissioners.39 This, in effect, undermines the population’s right to elect its 
own regional representatives and thus undermines democratic principles. Of 
course, the ability to vote in regional elections has been granted by Parliament 
in the first place and is thus derived from Parliament’s original competency to 
govern over regional matters.40 Nevertheless, a derogation from a democratic 
right, once granted, is not a matter to be taken lightly. Such a step is clearly 
exceptional, particularly as it only applies to one region – only residents of the 
Canterbury region have lost their voice on regional council matters.
The Act further contained a range of provisions designed to effect the 
purpose of the Act. Joseph identifies four unusual constitutional aspects of 
the Act which are in contravention of rule of law principles: (1) parts of the 
Act apply to one specific water conservation order and is thus ad hominem 
rather than general; (2) as a consequence of the ad hominem provisions, those 
parts have retrospective effect; (3) it contains a Henry VIII clause by allowing 
the responsible Minister to override certain provisions of the Resource 
Management Act 1991; and (4) it restricts the ability to challenge changes to 
the regional plans in the Environment Court.41
These provisions of the CER Act and the ECan Act are clearly extraordinary. 
In the context of the latter, the Ministry of Justice referred to the removal of 
elected councillors and the deferral of local body elections as of “constitutional 
significance.”42 Yet, neither Act required the existence of an extraordinary 
situation or a specific action to be taken before these powers became available 
(such as a public declaration of a state of emergency). As such, these provisions 
are formally ordinary powers; the Regulations Review Committee’s interim 
report mentioned neither Act as a source of emergency powers. This shows 
that whether statutory powers are formally extraordinary in New Zealand 
depends solely on what Parliament declares to be extraordinary. It also shows 
38 Stephen Argument “Henry VIII clauses – Fact Sheet” (November 2011) ACT Legislative 
Assembly <www.parliament.act.gov.au>.
39 Environment Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water Management) 
Act s 9. The Act has been repealed and replaced by the Environment Canterbury (Transitional 
Governance Arrangements) Act 2016 on 9 May 2016. The new Act allows for seven elected 
and six appointed members, at s 9. 
40 Local Electoral Act 2001, s 19E.
41 Philip Joseph “Environment Canterbury Legislation” (2010) NZLJ 193.
42 Cabinet Paper “Response to Review of Environment Canterbury” (29 March 2010) at [102].
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that the group of public powers that are formally extraordinary do not include 
all functionally extraordinary public powers.
III. When is the use of extraordinary powers appropriate?
However, neither Act stood in a constitutional vacuum. They responded 
to what could be perceived as exceptional circumstances: earthquakes which 
had devastated large parts of the Canterbury region and a potential water 
management crisis. It is therefore arguable that these powers, whether they 
were formally recognised as extraordinary or not, were appropriate for the 
respective situations. As discussed above, however, there are no constitutional 
mechanisms to determine the propriety of such extraordinary powers. 
Without the ability to review statutory powers or a standard against which 
to measure them, there is a danger that extraordinary powers are normalised 
and start creeping into ordinary legislation unrecognised.43
A. A taxonomy of extraordinary powers
The presence of a legislative review structure does not mean that the 
determination of whether a statutory power is appropriate is always clear. In 
the United States, Bernadette Meyler has created a taxonomy of extraordinary 
powers and the extent to which they can justifiably interfere with constitutional 
norms.44 She describes three categories of emergency situations: political, 
natural, and economic. Political emergencies are situations that have been 
created directly through human actions. They encompass such events as 
internal or external armed conflicts (war, civil war, incursions, rebellions, 
and so on) as well as terrorist attacks. Natural emergencies are, as the name 
suggests, naturally occurring disasters and force majeure events such as 
earthquakes, floods, and volcanic eruptions.45 And economic emergencies are 
those events that severely and negatively impact the economy of a country. 
Examples of this are the Great Depression of the 1920s and 1930s or the 
Greek financial crisis.46
Each of these types of emergencies may impact constitutional norms 
in different ways. The existence of a political emergency may put the very 
integrity of a country, and thus its constitutional order, at risk – particularly 
if the country is under occupation or threat of occupation. Consequently, 
43 Ferejohn and Pasquino, above n 3, at 219; Oren Gross “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses 
to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?” 2003 (112) Yale LJ 1011, at 1090.
44 Bernadette Meyler “Economic emergency and the rule of law” 2007 56(2) DePaul Law 
Review at 539.
45 Some argue that the emergency created by natural events is “man-made”, as it often is a result 
of vulnerabilities in the design and construction of buildings and infrastructure, see NZ Law 
Commission, above n 9, at [2.23].
46 See Gross, above n 43, at 1025.
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it may be more easily justifiable to veer from applying strict constitutional 
procedures if the very existence of the constitution is in peril. Immediate 
and extensive action may be required, and more intensive infringements on 
constitutional norms and individual liberties may therefore be acceptable.47 
Natural disasters, on the other hand, tend to be localised to a specific area 
of a country. During such emergencies, the primary concern of the state is not 
the long-term preservation of the constitutional order, as it is not endangered. 
Rather, the focus is on coordination of emergency services and resources for 
the rescue effort, as well as general infrastructure concerns in the affected 
area. Extraordinary powers tend to focus on facilitating rescue efforts and 
providing emergency relief by expediting decision-making processes and 
restricting individual rights to movement and property. 
Finally, economic emergencies endanger the economic stability of a 
country, and as such the closely related political and social stability. Therefore, 
a grave threat to a country’s economy can be a threat to the integrity of the 
state and, thus, its constitutional order. However, not every threat to the 
economy warrants constitutional derogation: the economy is under constant 
threat from ordinary events such as unemployment, currency fluctuations, 
and other adverse events.48 The threat must therefore be of such severity that 
only extraordinary action can mitigate long-term adverse effects on the state 
as a whole. Government action thus generally focusses on fiscal action such 
as taxation and subsidies. Unless the emergency happens extremely suddenly, 
however, there is generally no need for extraordinary public powers because 
the lack of immediacy allows for more moderate and ordinary response.49 In 
fact, the Law Commission identified only a few emergency provisions “that 
might be classified as economic” in New Zealand,50 while the Regulatory 
Review Committee identified only one.51
Each emergency requires its own set of responses and the extent of 
derogation from ordinary constitutional processes depends on the specific 
circumstances of the situation. However, Meyler’s taxonomy can act as a 
guideline. It posits that certain types of emergencies, particularly economic 
ones, do not require as severe measures as other types of emergencies. As seen 
above, infringements on political rights, such as the right to vote, to freely 
assemble, or to other democratic processes, and individual rights, such as 
the right to life, freedom, or opinion, are less justifiable than infringements 
on economic rights, which is mainly the right to property.52 Therefore, as 
economic emergencies tend to be less urgent or immediate than political or 
natural emergencies, extraordinary powers that infringe on constitutional 
47 At 1026.
48 Meyler, above n 44, at 565.
49 Gross, above n 43, at 1026.
50 NZ Law Commission, above n 9, at [3.104].
51 Under s 9(2) Defence Act 1990, the Armed Forces may be used to provide public services; 
Regulations Review Committee, above n 15, at 70.
52 Meyler, above n 44, at 565.
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norms and processes relating to political and individual rights are less likely 
to be appropriate. 
Meyler writes within the much stricter rights-based context of US 
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the underlying premise of her taxonomy 
applies to the New Zealand constitutional context as well. We can use it as 
a framework to better evaluate the extraordinary powers created by the CER 
Act and the ECan Act.
B. Applying the taxonomy of extraordinary powers to the CER Act and the 
ECan Act
As previously discussed, the extraordinary powers provided for by the CER 
Act were largely similar to, or even exceeded, those available during a state 
of emergency under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act. These 
powers affected people’s property, but also their freedom of movement53 and 
access to the courts; it also affected the constitutional relationship between 
Parliament and the executive in form of the Henry VIII clause. Such powers 
are quite drastic, but are arguably appropriate in the context of a devastating 
natural disaster which requires quick and decisive response. In its “Inquiry 
into Parliament’s legislative response to future national emergencies”, the 
Regulations Review Committee suggested that the powers conferred in the 
CER Act were broadly appropriate, even though some of the powers, in 
particular the Henry VIII clause, was broader than it needed to be.54 The 
Committee suggested, among other things, that emergency powers should be 
bespoke for each emergency and only confer powers that are strictly necessary; 
to that end, executive discretion when using such powers should also be 
limited to the extent necessary to deal with the emergency; and executive 
action should remain judicially reviewable.55
However, the Committee did not address how to determine whether 
a legislated emergency power is necessary in any given emergency. This is 
because it did not investigate the different natures of emergencies. It simply 
accepted the Government’s point of view that the recovery of the Canterbury 
region amounted to a national emergency, which required the CER Act 
to convey extraordinary powers. It failed to consider that, unlike the Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Act, the CER Act did not respond to the 
earthquakes directly. Rather, as its name suggests, the purpose of the Act was 
to aid the recovery of the region, not to respond to the immediate effects of the 
53 Both property and freedom of movement were particularly affected by the so-called “Central 
City Red Zone”, an exclusion zone around the Christchurch Central Business District 
enforced by the New Zealand Army. This exclusion zone remained in effect for two years; see 
“Christchurch CBD Cordon Reduction Map” Rebuild Christchurch (26 June 2016) <www.
rebuildchristchurch.co.nz>. 
54 Regulations Review Committee Inquiry into Parliament’s legislative response to future national 
emergencies (December 2016) at 18.
55 At 19-24.
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earthquakes. The need for a speedy recovery from natural disasters arises in 
part out of social and individual needs of the affected population. To be sure, 
in the months following the February earthquake there was much need for 
reinstating essential services and demolishing dangerous buildings. However, 
the main concern of the Act was to facilitate the rebuild of the region, and the 
primary focus of the rebuilding effort was economic. Without proper roads, 
a robust system of essential services, and a functioning city centre, the local 
economy would have receded catastrophically. The purpose of the Act was 
therefore to mitigate an economic disaster, rather than a natural one. 
According to Meyler’s taxonomy, this means that extraordinary powers 
should have been limited to what is strictly necessary in the context of an 
economic emergency. Initially, powers that exempted CERA from certain 
provisions of the Resource Management Act or that facilitated public 
works were arguably appropriate, as they streamlined bureaucracy and thus 
expedited the recovery process. On the other hand, the restriction of access 
to the courts and especially the Henry VIII clause were arguably excessive.56 
Admittedly, the Orders in Council resulting from the Act were largely aimed 
at streamlining and reducing bureaucracy.57 But each order that overrode 
parliamentary legislation could have been made by Parliament. At that stage, 
there was no urgency that required immediate action. As such, several of 
the extraordinary powers under the Act seem out of proportion and thus 
inappropriate.
The nature of the situation to which the ECan Act responded is somewhat 
more difficult to discern. As Canterbury is a major source of fresh water in 
New Zealand, the lack of water management strategies arguably poses an 
environmental threat. However, the main reasons given for introducing this 
legislation were the economic importance of water, both to the Canterbury 
region and New Zealand as a whole.58 Many of the arguments relied on the 
fact that Environment Canterbury did not meet statutory timelines relating 
to consent applications and the resultant adverse economic effects. As such, 
removing elected councillors, barring access to the Environment Court, and 
the Henry VIII clause appear excessive for a situation that is more akin to an 
economic emergency than a natural disaster.59
It can even be argued that, neither during the aftermath of the Canterbury 
earthquakes, nor during the difficulties with Environment Canterbury, an 
emergency situation existed at all. In emergency management theory, there 
56 See also Andrew Geddis, “An Open Letter to the People of New Zealand and their Parliament” 
Pundit (28 September 2010) <pundit.co.nz>. 
57 “The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011” Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (12 August 2016) <cerarchive.dpmc.govt.nz>.
58 Ministry for the Environment, above n 2; see also (30 March 2010) 661 NZPD 9927.
59 See also Ike Kleynbos and Ann Brower “Changes in urban and Environmental Governance in 
Canterbury from 2010 to 2015: Comparing Environment Canterbury and Christchurch City 
Council” 2015 11 Policy Quarterly at 46; Neil Gunningham and Cameron Holley “Natural 
Resources, New Governance and Legal Regulation: When does collaboration work?” (2011) 
24 NZULR 309.
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is a clear distinction between emergency response and emergency recovery.60 
The former requires extraordinary powers in order to respond to an acute 
threat to people’s life and/or property, while the latter does not require such 
powers, as the immediacy of the situation has passed. By the time the CER 
Act was passed, most if not all acute threats had passed. Any action taken 
under extraordinary powers could have been achieved through ordinary acts 
of Parliament, following ordinary constitutional processes, without further 
endangering life or property unduly. Similarly, it can be argued that it is 
doubtful that the situation leading to the ECan Act can be considered an 
emergency. The decrease in processing consent applications within statutory 
time limits can be correlated to a 40 per cent increase in dairy farming in 
the region over the same time.61 Although this raises issues which needed 
to be addressed, the government already had abilities within the Resource 
Management Act and the Local Government Act to respond to these.62 
Moreover, by the time the Act was passed, Environment Canterbury had 
increased processing times to levels similar to other Councils.63
IV. Extraordinary Powers and Political Constitutionalism
Applying Meyler’s taxonomy to the two Acts suggests that their use of 
extraordinary provisions is, at least to a certain extent, inappropriate. Both 
statutes contain constitutionally significant extraordinary provisions which 
appear disproportionate to the requirements of their respective emergencies; 
it is even unclear whether the situations could be deemed emergencies at all. 
As mentioned before, however, Meyler writes in a different constitutional 
context. The constitutional system of the United States is not only more rights-
based than New Zealand’s, but it is also designed to spread public power more 
evenly between the branches of government.64 American constitutionalism 
(as well as that of many other modern democracies) emphasises the desire to 
limit government power. It does so by institutional arrangement, that is, a 
clear separation of powers and a consequent system of governmental checks 
and balances. Each branch of government has limited competencies and can, 
to a further or lesser extent, control the actions of the other branches. In 
particular, it aims to limit both executive and legislative power. It is based on 
the liberal democratic ideal that individual rights must be protected from all 
60 NZ Law Commission, above n 9, at [2.25]–[2.29].
61 Ministry for the Environment Resource Management Act: Two-yearly Survey of Local Authorities 
2007/2008 (ME 937, 2007) Appendix 1; this was by far the largest increase of any region of 
New Zealand.
62 Cabinet Paper, above n 42.
63 Environment Canterbury Annual Report 2009/2010 (2010) at 70.
64 Jo Eric Kushal Murkens “Constitutionalism” in Mark Bevir (ed) Encyclopedia of political 
theory (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks (CA), 2010),at 288.
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government action, even that of the legislature. As Kushal Murkans puts it: 
“The raison d’ être of constitutionalism is the legalization of political rule.”65
This legalisation comes in the form of legal review mechanisms, wherein 
the actions of each branch is controlled through judicial means. This concept 
of constitutionalism requires the existence of some kind of higher law, which 
establishes these legal mechanisms and provides a standard against which 
public actions can be evaluated.66 These rules must not stem from ordinary 
legislation, as that would allow the legislature to sidestep the controls and 
thus put it into a superior position. Legal review is generally undertaken by 
some form of judicial body. In the United States and Canada, for example, 
this form of constitutional review is undertaken by the ordinary courts.67 
Other jurisdictions employ a specialised Constitutional Court for review of 
parliamentary legislation, in recognition of the distinctly political aspect of 
its role.68
That means that any powers created by the legislature, be they extraordinary 
or not, are subject to systemic scrutiny and can be found to be unjustified, and 
thus void, within the wider constitutional context. In such a constitutional 
system, Meyler’s taxonomy has clearly defined borders. Constitutional 
norms and individual rights are defined within rules superior to ordinary 
legislation. Any infringement on such rules can thus be measured against a 
clear norm, against standards set by the constitution. Of course, this does not 
mean that the outcome of such an exercise is always clear – the justification 
for infringements is still up for debate. However, higher law provides for a 
clear standard of constitutional norms, and legal review mechanisms create a 
forum in which the propriety of extraordinary public powers can be assessed.
The New Zealand political system does not allow for legal mechanisms 
to review legislative power. Constitutional compliance is instead achieved 
through political means.69 Tushnet explains that the political safeguard lies 
in the democratic process and the resulting accountability of members of 
the legislature to the electorate.70 Parliamentarians are elected on the basis 
that they represent the views of their constituents. As such, as long as the 
constituents have an interest in constitutional compliance, the legislature will 
too. The legislator relies on their constituents’ favour in order to be re-elected, 
and, therefore, will act in their interest. If the constituency is indifferent to 
constitutional considerations, they have delegated their decision on these 
matters to the elected legislator. Other political mechanisms, such as a 
robust legislative process, are meant to ensure constitutional compliance ex 
65 At 294.
66 At 288.
67 Tushnet, above n 4, at 48.
68 At 49.
69 Mark Elliott “Interpretative Bills of Rights and the Mystery of the Unwritten Constitution” 
2011 NZLR 591 at 609.
70 Tushnet, above n 4, at 46.
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ante. Particularly the select committee stage provides a forum for reasonable 
discussion and public input around constitutional considerations.71
Political constitutionalism is a necessary consequence of parliamentary 
sovereignty: there cannot be fundamental law that reigns supreme over 
parliamentary legislation. Nor can there be any state actor that can find 
parliamentary legislation void. The legislature is considered the political 
actor whose powers are neither derived from, nor controlled by any other 
constitutional entity. The only way to hold Parliament directly accountable 
for its actions is through the political process of democratic elections. Within 
such a system, Meyler’s taxonomy is meaningless, as public powers cannot 
be measured against a fundamental standard provided for by higher law. 
The propriety of extraordinary powers cannot be decided through legal 
mechanisms; it can only be decided at the ballot box.
The weakness of political constitutionalism is twofold: the legislature 
may be unaware that a constitutionally problematic provision is embedded 
deeply within an otherwise ordinary piece of legislation; and legislators may 
not be conscientious when it comes to constitutional matters.72 The former 
can be relatively easily remedied by creating mechanisms which vet proposed 
legislation for potential constitutional inconsistencies. In New Zealand, an 
example of such a mechanism is the Attorney-General’s statutory role of 
reporting inconsistencies of any newly introduced Bill with the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990.73 The latter is not as easily mitigated, and is therefore 
the basis of much of the criticism levelled at political constitutionalism.74
In practice, however, the theoretical difference between legal 
constitutionalism with its legal review mechanisms and political 
constitutionalism may not be significant. The threat of the constituency’s 
wrath and the parliamentarian’s own constitutional conscience may be 
sufficient to provide adequate protection of constitutional provisions. In 
addition, even in jurisdictions in which parliament reigns supreme, the 
judiciary still plays a part in policing constitutional compliance – it can raise 
attention to constitutional issues in a “weak form” of judicial review.75
The effectiveness of weak form judicial review depends, however, on the 
goodwill of the government, and, in particular, parliament. Elliott investigates 
the effects of bills of rights in political systems with unwritten constitutions 
and parliamentary sovereignty, namely the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand.76 Among other things, he addresses the effectiveness of weak form 
judicial review in the context of political constitutionalism. He finds that 
71 JF Burrows and RI Carter Statute law in New Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington (New 
Zealand), 2009) at 87–95.
72 Tushnet, above n 4, at 47.
73 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 7.
74 Murkens, above n 64, at 292, Tushnet, above n 4, at 45.
75 As opposed to the ‘strong form’ judicial review that can bar parliamentary legislation; see Tom 
Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon Comparative constitutional law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 
(UK), 2011) at 271.
76 Elliott, above n 69.
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New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) 
have a transformative effect on their respective countries’ constitutions. Both 
countries’ courts have the ability to declare statutory provisions inconsistent 
with their bills of rights, although only in the United Kingdom is this a 
statutory power.77 Elliot finds that in the United Kingdom, this weak form 
approach to judicial review is exceptionally effective: out of 19 declarations of 
incompatibility, 18 were remedied by the government.78
The United Kingdom government’s tendency to react so favourably to the 
courts’ declarations may, of course, not wholly result from their strong desire 
for constitutional compliance. Other political factors are likely at play, such 
as the European Convention on Human Rights and the resulting questions 
about the hierarchical relationship of United Kingdom courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights; and the United Kingdom’s membership 
in the European Union.79 
These considerations do not exist in New Zealand. According to Elliot, 
it appears that the New Zealand government is not as likely to follow the 
courts’ findings.80 For example, in R v Hansen81 the Supreme Court opined 
that s 6(6) Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 could not be interpreted in consistence 
with the right of presumption of innocence contained in s 25(c) New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act. Yet, a decade later, the provision remains on the statute 
books.
Another sign that New Zealand legislators may not be very conscious 
of, or even conscientious about, constitutional processes is their use of the 
urgency motion during the legislative process. Urgency allows Parliament to 
expedite the legislative process by omitting one or several of the stand-down 
periods between legislative stages (for example, between the Committee of 
the Whole House stage and the Third Reading stage).82 Parliament makes 
use of the motion relatively frequently, albeit mostly in a way that appears 
constitutionally unproblematic.83 However, in its most extreme form, 
urgency allows Parliament to omit all stand-down periods as well as the Select 
Committee stage altogether.84 In this form, a Bill can be introduced and 
passed in a single sitting. The only requirement for passing the motion is that 
77 Human Rights Act (UK), s 4; see also Claudia Geiringer “On the Road to Nowhere: Implied 
Declarations of Inconsistency and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act” (2009) 40 VUWLR 
613.
78 Elliott, above n 69, at 61.
79 Murkens, above n 64, at 293.
80 Elliott, above n 69, at 612–613; citing Andrew Geddis “Prisoner Voting and Rights 
Deliberation: How New Zealand’s Parliament Failed” [2011] NZ L Rev 443 at 467–472; 
and Claudia Geiringer “The Dead Hand of the Bill of Rights? Is the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 a Substantive Legal Constraint on Parliament’s Power to Legislate?” (2007) 
11 Otago LR 389 at 397–401.
81 R v Hansen (2007) NZSC 7.
82 Burrows and Carter, above n 71, at 85, 86.
83 Sascha Mueller “Where’s the Fire: The Use and Abuse of Urgency in the Legislative Process” 
(2011) 17(2) CantLR at 328.
84 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2014, SO 58.
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the moving minister give reasons for using urgency. There are no standards 
regarding the reasons, and they cannot be challenged.85 Passing legislation at 
such speed is a substantial derogation from the ordinary legislative process and 
can, as such, be regarded as an extraordinary legislative power. It is justifiable 
during exceptional situations, yet it is employed with concerning frequency.86
Both the CER Act and the ECan Act were passed in one sitting under 
urgency. It is arguable that the former Act was urgently required in order to 
be able to lift the state of emergency which, at the time, had been in force 
for 10 weeks. However, in view of the fact that, in many respects, the Act 
functionally extended the state of emergency for five years, a few more weeks 
of deliberation may have resulted in an Act with fewer sweeping and more 
appropriate extraordinary powers.87 As for the latter Act, as mentioned above 
it is not clear that there was an urgent situation which had to be dealt with 
in the first place. Even if the water management of the region was heading 
towards an economic and environmental disaster, it had been doing so for 
several years and the disaster would not have manifested itself within the next 
few days of introducing the legislation. This was an ongoing event which did 
not require urgent and immediate legislation.
V. Legality, Legitimacy, and No 8 Fencing Wire
Within the New Zealand system of parliamentary sovereignty and 
political constitutionalism, neither Act can be regarded as “unconstitutional”. 
Parliament can create public powers, ranging from benignly ordinary to 
extremely extraordinary. It is accountable only politically, to the public 
in general elections. The CER Act and the ECan Act may have included 
excessive powers and been passed in a constitutionally concerning manner, 
but they were passed entirely within Parliament’s competency.
What Parliament does and what it ought to do are, of course, not the same. 
Dyzenhaus distinguishes between the power of sovereign parliaments to act 
and their authority.88 He bases this claim on Dicey’s discussion of Parliament’s 
ability to legislate for Martial Law, which requires the existence of a statute 
which is unconstitutional, as it suspends parliamentary sovereignty, but 
nonetheless valid.89 Admittedly, neither the CER Act nor ECan Act impact 
on Parliament’s sovereignty, perhaps with the exception of the Henry VIII 
clauses. But even those do not suspend its sovereignty, as Parliament can 
withdraw its delegation to legislate at any stage. 
85 At SO 57.
86 Mueller, above n 83, at 316.
87 Green Party MP Kennedy Graham raised this concern during the First Reading of the bill 
(12 April 2011) 671 NZPD 17907.
88 Dyzenhaus, above n 18, at 42–53.
89 At 49.
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But, the distinction between power and authority raises an interesting 
possibility: that there is a difference between a statutory power’s constitutional 
legality and its moral legitimacy. Parliament is free to create public powers, 
but it should do so within reasonable limits. The legislature holds the trust of 
the people that it will uphold democratic principles and constitutional ideals. 
In an ideal world, therefore, the discrepancy between legal and legitimate 
parliamentary action would be minimal.
Unfortunately, New Zealand has a history of misused extraordinary 
powers.90 When dockworkers refused to work overtime after failed wage 
negotiations in 1951, the government of the day interpreted this as strike 
action and activated its extraordinary powers under the Public Safety 
Conservation Act 1932 (PCSA), as it regarded the dockworker’s action a threat 
to New Zealand’s economy.91 By way of regulation, freedom of expression 
and assembly were restricted and picketing was declared an offence, among 
other things. Similarly, the Economic Stabilisation Act 1948 (ESA) enabled 
the Governor-General to create regulations when deemed necessary for 
the purpose of promoting economic stability. Over the next four decades, 
governments took frequent advantage of these powers, in particular the 
Muldoon government in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The excessive use of 
the ESA at the time led Shelton to lament that there was a growing divergence 
between constitutional theory and practice, and that “the coherence of the 
constitution [was] breaking down”.92 The examples discussed in this article 
suggest a renaissance of economic extraordinary powers.
A tendency apparently exists that governments purport an economic 
emergency to justify the necessity of extraordinary powers. Meyler argues 
that this preference to label an event an economic emergency is a result of the 
popular view that the economy is an uncontrollable force, with which one 
cannot negotiate.93 Governments can, therefore, merely react to such a force 
and thus remove the issue of responsibility for the crisis. That also makes 
the notion that extraordinary powers are appropriate in such situations more 
compelling.94
The question remains why there are so few political consequences if 
these extraordinary powers are as constitutionally concerning as this article 
suggests. Although both the PCSA and the ESA were repealed after the end 
of the Muldoon era, it took many decades and over 200 regulations before 
this happened. And while there was some initial public concern about the 
90 GWR Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled power: New Zealand’s constitution and government 
(4th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) at 209–212.
91 Public Safety Conservation Act 1932, s 2(1).
92 D Shelton Government, the Economy and the Constitution (LLM Thesis, Faculty of Law, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 1980) at 392; cited in: Palmer and Palmer, above n 90, at 
210.
93 Meyler, above n 44, at 552.
94 At 547, 548.
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extent of extraordinary powers under the CER Act and the ECan Act, the 
government was still in power after two general elections.95
The problem lies in the fact that, for political constitutionalism to effectively 
control excessive government powers, it requires conscientious legislators 
and a well-informed constituency. As seen above, the history of Parliament’s 
constitutional conscientiousness is spotty at best. This weakness in the 
political system is exacerbated by the fact that New Zealand’s adherence to 
parliamentary sovereignty is likely the strongest of all modern democracies.96 
The United Kingdom has two parliamentary chambers acting as a check and it 
is bound to an international human rights regime through its Human Rights 
Act. New Zealand has neither. Furthermore, our parliamentary system creates 
a close personal proximity between the legislature and executive, so that the 
latter plays a major part in creating its own extraordinary powers. And, if the 
spectre of economic decline is a constant part of the government’s rhetoric, 
constitutional concerns take a backseat in the minds of the constituency 
facing a purported economic crisis.
This is not to say that the executive is malevolently usurping Parliament’s 
powers. Both the CER Act and the ECan Act were addressing legitimate 
issues. While these issues likely did not require extraordinary powers (or 
at least not the extent of these powers), it was more convenient to simply 
empower the government and “get on with it”, unburdened by constitutional 
processes and bureaucracy. However, this approach to constitutionalism is 
not sustainable in the long term. Convenience is not a viable replacement for 
constitutional principle. A sustained use of extraordinary power runs the risk 
of normalising it. If the use of extraordinary power is not temporary but long 
term, the powers cease to be extraordinary and will become constitutionally 
transformative – thus fulfilling Shelton’s prediction.97
VI. Conclusion
The lack of constitutional safeguards allows Parliament to create 
extraordinary public powers that are not designated as emergency powers, 
and are therefore used in non-emergency and ordinary situations. This blurs 
the line between ordinary and extraordinary powers and may normalise the 
use of extraordinary powers. As the examples of the CER Act and the ECan 
Acts show, such blurred lines allow extraordinary powers to be created for the 
sake of convenience rather than necessity.
95 Andrew Geddis, “An Open Letter to the People of New Zealand and their Parliament” Pundit 
(28 September 2010) <pundit.co.nz>; Philip Joseph “Environment Canterbury Legislation” 
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In its final report on the legislative response to national emergencies, 
the Regulations Review Committee found that the powers extended to the 
government by the CER Act had been too extensive.98 This assessment was 
particularly due to the broad law-making powers and the lack of safeguards 
in the Act. But the Committee’s recommendations may not be sufficient, 
as they only extend to formally designated emergency powers and leave the 
determination of which powers are necessary to Parliament. It may be time 
to revisit the extent of parliamentary sovereignty in New Zealand. No other 
modern democracy applies it as strictly as we do, and we should consider 
adding our own restrictions on Parliament’s powers. It is both unnecessary 
and unrealistic to change our constitutional system wholesale and introduce 
some form of strong judicial review of legislation. It may be enough to 
introduce a formal way for our courts to declare a statutory provision to be 
inconsistent with constitutional principles, and strengthen legislative vetting 
process before a Bill is introduced in Parliament. This represents an interesting 
midway point between political and legal constitutionalism, and it allows 
Parliament to retain its sovereignty.
98  Regulations Review Committee, above n 54, at 18.
